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Abstract: Through a review of recent case history, this article examines the role 
of courts in land use decisions.  The consensus of the holdings is that a court 
should not substitute it’s discretion for that of a local land use board so long as 
the board’s decision was based on substantial evidence on the record.  The 
rational for this standard of deference is based on the idea that local land use 
boards are legislative bodies that understand the needs of the communities they 
serve.  This article highlights several instances where appeals courts reign in the 
power of trial courts that overstepped judicial bounds by annulling valid land use 
board decisions.   
 
*** 
 
During the 2004-2005 Term, the New York Court of Appeals handed down 
decisions covering a broad range of issues in land use and property law. Evident 
in the court’s decisions this term is the maturity of New York case law. Many of 
its major holdings correct the decisions of lower courts that misapplied or 
misunderstood previously-settled principles.  The Court of Appeals continued this 
year to struggle with the U.S. Supreme Court’s holdings in the regulatory takings 
field.  Subsequent to this term’s takings decision (Smith v. Mendon), the U.S. 
Supreme Court clarified this area of law in Lingle v. Chevron.  Future Court of 
Appeals cases will follow the Court’s simplified tests for takings; this will modify 
the rationale, rather than the results, of New York cases on the subject.   
 
Regulatory Takings 
 
In Smith v. Town of Mendon,1 the Court of Appeals held that a 
conservation restriction imposed as a condition to site plan approval is not an 
exaction and is not subject to heightened judicial scrutiny under the Nollan/Dolan 
tests when challenged as a regulatory taking.  The Mendon Planning Board 
conditioned its approval of the Smiths’ single family home proposal on the filing 
of conservation restriction covering portions of the parcel located within the 
town’s environmental protection overlay districts.  The court declined “to extend 
 2 
the concept of exaction where there is no dedication of property to public use and 
the restriction merely places conditions on development.”2  The court instead 
reviewed the case using the Supreme Court’s Agins test and found that the 
conservation restriction did not constitute a taking because it did not deny the 
Smiths all economically viable use of their property and “the conservation 
restriction substantially advances a legitimate government purpose – 
environmental preservation.”3
 
 
On May 23, 2005, in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,4 the Supreme Court 
“correct[ed] course” in a unanimous decision holding that the Agins “substantially 
advances” formula is not an appropriate test for determining whether a regulation 
constitutes a taking under the Fifth Amendment.  The “formula prescribes an 
inquiry in the nature of a due process, not a takings, test, and . . . it has no proper 
place in . . . takings jurisprudence.”5
 
  The effect of the Court’s holding and its 
explanatory dicta is to clarify greatly the field of regulatory takings law as applied 
to land use regulations and agency determinations. 
The Court in Lingle identifies four categories of regulatory takings cases.    
The first two categories are per se takings: void on their face without regard to 
the extent of their impact on aggrieved property owners.  “First, where 
government requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of her 
property – however minor – it must provide just compensation.”6  “A second 
categorical rule applies to regulations that completely deprive an owner of ‘all 
economically beneficial use’ of her property.”7  The third category, land use 
exactions, involves the imposition by a land use approval board of a condition 
requiring a landowner dedicate an easement allowing public access to her 
property – the effect of which is to oust the landowner from a portion of her 
domain.8
 
    
All other regulatory takings challenges are governed by the standards set 
forth in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City.”9  The Penn Central 
“principal guidelines” are: the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, 
particularly the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct 
investment-backed expectations, and the character of the governmental 
regulation.  “[T]he Penn Central inquiry turns in large part, albeit not exclusively, 
upon the magnitude of a regulation’s economic impact and the degree to which it 
interferes with legitimate property interests.”10
 
  Under current takings 
jurisprudence, the Court of Appeals in Smith would have analyzed the 
conservation restriction using the Penn Central test and not the Agins test.   
Confirming Existing Jurisprudence 
 
Zoning and Planning 
 
In the Matter of Crown Communication New York, Inc. v. Department of 
Transportation of the State of New York, City of New Rochelle et al.,11 the Court 
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of Appeals held that the commercial telecommunication providers are exempt 
from local zoning with regard to the installation of private antennae on state 
owned telecommunication towers.  In 1997, Castle Tower Holding Corporation 
(later assigned to Crown Communication New York, Inc.) and the New York 
State Police, on behalf of participating State agencies, entered into an agreement 
providing Castle with an exclusive license to build and operate 
telecommunications towers on state-owned lands and rights-of-way.  The 
agreement also allowed for the licensing of space on the towers to localities and 
commercial wireless providers.  Crown identified two sites for towers in the City 
of New Rochelle along the Hutchinson River Parkway and licensed space on the 
towers to several private telecommunications companies.  Crown constructed 
one of the towers and then began construction on the second tower at which time 
the City issued a stop work order, claiming that a special permit from the City 
was necessary for the construction of the towers in compliance with local zoning.   
 
In 2001, Crown commenced an action to prohibit the City from enforcing 
its zoning and to declare that the towers were immune from local regulation.  The 
Court of Appeals held that Crown and the private wireless telecommunications 
providers were exempt from the local zoning laws.  “[T]elecommunication 
companies ‘are not precluded from enjoying the State’s immunity simply because 
they are private entities or because co-locating on the DOT’s towers will advance 
their financial interest.’”12  “[I]t is not the private status of the Wireless Telephone 
Providers but, rather, the public nature of the activity sought to be regulated by 
the local zoning authority that is determinative in this case.”13
 
  
The court applied the County of Monroe “balancing of public interests” test 
and weighed “the nature and scope of the instrumentality seeking immunity, the 
kind of function or land use involved, the extent of the public interest to be served 
thereby, the effect local land use regulation would have upon the enterprise 
concerned and the impact upon legitimate local interest.”14  The court held that 
the State provided evidence that the towers would afford numerous benefits to 
the public, including the development of a Statewide Wireless Network and the 
Intelligent Transportation System that collects information on traffic flow, weather, 
and road conditions.  The court held that “the installation of licensed commercial 
antennae on the towers should also be accorded immunity because co-location 
serves a number of significant public interests that are advanced by the State’s 
overall telecommunications plan.”15  The fact that the private wireless providers 
will profit from use of the towers does not undermine the public interest served.16  
“[T]he public and private uses of the towers are sufficiently intertwined to justify 
exemption of the wireless providers from local zoning regulations.”17
 
 
In Town of Concord v. Duwe,18 the Court of Appeals upheld Duwe’s 
convictions for violating the local recycling ordinance and zoning ordinance 
resulting from the operation of a commercial mulching operation using tree bark 
on his property.  The court held that the local ordinances were not preempted by 
or inconsistent with the state Solid Waste Management Act.  “[L]ocal laws 
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governing municipal solid waste management broader than—but consistent 
with—the state legislation are explicitly permitted by the Environmental 
Conservation Law.”19
 
  In 1980, in Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. 
Caledonia, the court held the solid waste disposal provisions in the 
Environmental Conservation Law did not preempt the field of waste 
management.  When the legislature enacted the Solid Waste Management Act in 
1988 it could have chosen to preempt the field in light of Monroe-Livingston, but 
did not.  The court concluded that the legislature did not intend to preempt the 
field and local governments are free to enact and enforce ordinances to deal with 
local waste.  In addition, the local ordinance’s definition of solid waste was not 
inconsistent with the Solid Waste Management Act. 
As it has several times in recent terms, the Court of Appeals had to restrain 
lower courts from substituting their judgments for those of local land use boards.  
In Metro Enviro Transfer v. Village of Croton-On-Hudson,20 the Court of Appeals 
reiterated the role of the courts in reviewing discretionary land use decisions.21
 
  
The court upheld the village board of trustees’ denial of Metro Enviro Transfer’s 
application for renewal of its special use permit to operate a waste transfer facility 
in the village.  The original permit gave the village the right to revoke it if any of 
its conditions or limitations were violated.  On numerous occasions Metro 
intentionally violated the conditions in the permit and the board refused to reissue 
the permit as a result.  Metro Enviro Transfer argued and the supreme court 
agreed that because there was no actual harm to the community or the 
environment, the board’s denial of the permit renewal was arbitrary and 
capricious and not supported by substantial evidence.  During the three-year 
special permit, Metro exceeded the capacity limitations on 26 occasions and 
falsified records to hide the excesses.  The facility accepted prohibited waste at 
least 42 times, did not adequately train its personnel, kept insufficient records, 
and inappropriately stored tires on the site.  Metro admitted to these violations 
and paid fines for many of the violations.   
 Following extensive hearings, the board denied Metro’s application to 
renew its permit.  In support of its decision, the board released a 15-page 
statement of findings which included a chart summarizing the violations.  In the 
statement, the board relies significantly on the opinion of the town consultant who 
stated that Metro continually violates regulations that are designed to protect 
health and the environment despite its promises to improve.   
 
The Court of Appeals concluded that “[a]lthough inconsequential violations 
would not justify non-renewal, the many violations here, and their willful nature, 
sufficiently support the [b]oard’s decision.”22  The board’s decision whether to 
grant or renew a special permit is discretionary and will be upheld as long as it 
has a proper basis and is not based solely on generalizations.  “‘[E]xpert opinion . 
. . may not be disregarded in favor of generalized community objections,’”23
 
 but 
as long as there are other grounds in the record for the decision it will be upheld.   
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The court held that substantial evidence of actual harm was not necessary 
and the threat of harm from the repeated willful violations was sufficient grounds 
to deny the renewal.   
 
 “There may, of course, be instances in which an applicant’s violation is so 
trifling or de minimis that denying renewal would be arbitrary and capricious.”24  
Here, the board reviewed a substantial amount of evidence, it heard 
contradictory evidence from Metro’s expert and its own, considered the evidence 
and concluded that it could not continue to rely on Metro’s assurances of 
compliance.  “A reviewing court ‘may not substitute its own judgment for that of 
the board, even if such a contrary determination is itself supported by the 
record.’”25
 
  According to the court, even without the expert testimony, there was 
sufficient evidence to sustain the board’s denial of Metro’s renewal application.     
Real Property Tax 
 
In Malta Town Centre I, Ltd. v. Town of Malta Board of Assessment 
Review,26 the Court of Appeals held that a reassessment under Real Property 
Tax Law (RPTL) § 1573 can constitute an exception under the RPTL § 727 
three-year respite from any change in the assessed valuation of property.  In 
2001, the Town and Town Centre entered into a stipulation that reduced the 
assessed value of the Town Centre’s property to $7,800,000 for the 1998,1999, 
2000, and 2001 tax years.  The stipulation stated that the property would be 
subject to RPTL § 727 which provides for a three-respite from any change in the 
assessed valuation of the property.  An exception to the three-year grace period 
is when “a revaluation or update of all real property on the assessment roll” is 
conducted.  In 2002, a RPTL § 1573 reassessment was done by the town 
resulting in an increased assessed valuation for the Town Centre’s property to 
$9,750,000.  RPTL § 1573 gives aid to municipalities that “annually conduct a 
systematic analysis of all locally assessed properties using a methodology 
specified in . . . regulations [promulgated by the state board; and] annually 
revising assessments as necessary to maintain the stated uniform percentage 
value.”27  The Court of Appeals concluded that the RPTL § 1573 reassessment is 
evidence of “a revaluation or update of all real property on the assessment role”28
 
 
satisfying the exception to the RPTL § 727 three-year reprieve from changed 
assessments.   
In New York Telephone Company v. Supervisor of the Town of Oyster 
Bay, the Court of Appeals held that “RPTL 102(14) does not authorize the town 
to impose a special ad valorem levy for garbage collection on NYTC’s mass 
properties because they do not and cannot receive any direct benefit from the 
municipal service.”29   NYTC owns telephone lines, poles, and other related 
equipment on private and public land throughout the town.  It does not own any 
of the land where the equipment is located.  The town imposed on NYTC an ad 
valorum levy fee for garbage collection.  NYTC challenged the levy because it 
does not benefit from the garbage collection service as stated in the RPTL § 
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102(14) definition of ad valorem.  A property is benefited if it is capable of 
receiving the services funded.  The inquiry is based on the “innate features and 
legally permissible uses of the property, not the particularities of its owners or 
occupants or the state of the property at a fixed point in time.”30
 
  NYTC’s 
equipment is incapable of producing refuse and therefore cannot benefit from 
garbage collection.  The court concluded that the ad valorem levies were invalid 
and NYTC was entitled to reimbursement for previous payments.      
In the Word of Life Ministries v. Nassau County,31 the Court of Appeals 
held that the Word of Life Ministries properties that are used as residences for 
pastors are exempt from real property tax under RPTL § 462.  Section 462 
“states that ‘property owned by a religious corporation while actually used by the 
officiating clergymen thereof for residential purposes shall be exempt from 
taxation.’”  The court declined to adopt a restrictive definition of “officiating,” 
holding that the determination is based on the “cleric’s relationship with his or her 
congregation, and not the hierarchal structure of the various clergy positions.”32
 
  
The pastors who live at the properties in question all are ordained and take part 
in church services and share in the preaching and thus are “officiating clergy” 
entitling the ministry to exemption under § 462. 
State Environmental Quality Review Act 
 
In City Council of the City of Watervliet v. Town of Colonie,33 the Court of 
Appeals held that  “SEQRA requirements apply to all annexations under article 
17 of the General Municipal Law, but that the extent of environmental 
assessment that must be undertaken is dependent on the specific development 
plans associated with the transfer of territory.”34  Municipal Annexation Law, 
article 17 of the General Municipal Law, outlines the procedures required to 
effectuate an annexation of land from one municipality to another.  In the present 
case, East-West Realty Corporation sought to have 43 acres annexed from the 
Town of Colonie to the adjacent City of Watervliet.  The Colonie zoning law 
permits single-family residences and East-West intended to build assisted living 
senior apartments.  The Municipal Annexation Law requires a finding by both 
municipalities that the annexation is in the “over-all public interest.” Watervliet 
determined that it was, but Colonie decided that an environmental review under 
SEQRA is necessary to determine if the annexation is in the public interest.  At 
issue is whether SEQRA applies to municipal annexations even though the 
Municipal Annexation Law provides detailed procedures for annexation and does 
not explicitly incorporate SEQRA.  The court held that “SEQRA promotes, rather 
than undermines, the public interest purposes of article 17 of the General 
Municipal Law and therefore . . . General Municipal Law § 718 (5) does not 
exempt the annexation process from SEQRA review.”35
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